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THE ATLANTIC STATES' CLAIM 
TO OFFSHORE OIL RIGHTS: 
UNITED STATES V. MAINEl 
By William F. Henri'*' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The industrial world has come to realize that its natural energy 
supply is limited. The realization that petroleum supplies will soon 
be exhausted has given rise to a growing debate over the proper 
way to manage and conserve fuel resources. Specifically, in the 
United States, one critical question is which level of government 
is best able to manage marine mineral resources. Proponents of 
federal control assert that meaningful management and ecological 
control can be achieved only through a uniform, federal system of 
regulation. Proponents of state control insist that the states should 
have control over local resources. Furthermore, the states argue 
that they are more sensitive to local environmental problems caused 
by mineral or fuel extraction. In addition to these policy issues, the 
question of whether the federal government or the states have legal 
title to the offshore areas and the right to the revenues derived 
from their exploitation remains to be answered. 
United States v. Maine J2 presently before the United States Su-
preme Court, will affect the solution of these problems. Here, the 
original thirteen colonies are claiming for themselves the right 
to ownership and control of the seabed and subsoil of the Atlantic 
Coast in excess of three geographic miles from their coast lines. 
These claims are based on grants from the British Crown to the 
colonies in the colonial charters. 
The federal government, on the other hand, claims ownership 
of this area on the basis of the Submerged Lands Act. 
The outcome of this case will have significant economic and en-
vironmental consequences. At stake is a vast supply of untapped 
natural fuel resources. In 1971, geological exploration indicated 
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that the Atlantic continental shelf possesses 5.5 billion barrels 
of oil, 37 trillion cubic feet of gas and 1.1 billion barrels of natural 
gas liquids. As a means of comparison, the Gulf Coast supply has 
been estimated at somewhat more than 5 billion barrels. 
This article will initially consider the question of ownership and 
control of the seabed and subsoil of the ocean from an historical 
perspective. Particular attention will be given to the United States 
Supreme Court decision in United States v. California/ which 
established that the federal government, rather than the states, had 
dominion and control over offshore areas. 
Next will be discussed the Congressional action taken to adjust 
the situation created by the California decision. The Submerged 
Lands Act and subsequent litigation concerning the Act's meaning 
will be analyzed. While the Submerged Lands Act is asserted by 
Maine to have no effect on the present controversy, it is submitted 
that the cases litigating the scope of the Act, most notably United 
States v. Louisiana/ will determine the issues in Maine. It will be 
shown that the test devised by the Court in Louisiana to determine 
the extent of state ownership, even though dealing narrowly with 
a provision of the Submerged Lands Act, is applicable to the 
present controversy. 
Finally this article will examine in detail the claims of both the 
United States and Maine in the present controversy. Particular at-
tention will be given to Maine's claim that historical grants and 
charters operate to give it control over the area in dispute not-
withstanding the Submerged Lands Act. The claims of the state 
will probably not prevail, however, when measured ·against the 
rule developed in Louisiana. It is submitted that whether Maine's 
claims are measured against the terms of the Submerged Lands Act, 
as the United States asserts, or whether they are tested as to the 
efficacy of the grants, as the states assert, the federal government 
should prevail in either case. 
II. HISTORICAL OWNERSHIP 
It was not until after World War II that technological advances 
made it feasible to extract mineral resources from the subsoil of 
the continental shelf. These technological advances paralleled the 
discovery of vast quantities of mineral resources beneath the sub-
soil. Therefore, the question of ownership and control of the ocean 
adjacent to the coastal states has only recently become important. 
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Prior to this time, however, a considerable body of law had de-
veloped concerning dominion and control over inland waters. In 
1845 the United States Supreme Court in Pollard's Lessee v. 
Hagan5 held that as a result of the American Revolution each state 
became sovereign and that the states held the absolute right to all 
navigable waters and the soil under them, subject only to the rights 
surrendered to the United States by the Constitution. The Pollard 
Court held that navigable waters between the high and low water 
mark within each of the original thirteen states' boundaries is held 
in trust for the people of the state. States admitted to the Union 
after its formation enjoyed similar rights. 6 This ruling was com-
monly understood to mean that all waters within the boundaries 
of a state were held by the state, rather than by the federal govern-
ment. Pollard was upheld in the ensuing one hundred years.7 
However, the development and refinement of geological tech-
niques in the early twentieth century brought about a renewed 
interest in the ownership and control of offshore waters. 8 In 1947 
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. California9 
severely limited the application of the Pollard rule of state owner-
ship of offshore waters. 
In California the United States sought a declaration of its rights 
as against California. California claimed ownership of the area of 
the Pacific Ocean lying outside the ordinary low water mark of the 
coast of California and outside the inland waters of the state, ex-
tending seaward three nautical miles. As a result of this claim, Cali-
fornia had negotiated and issued numerous leases for the extraction 
of minerals. The federal government argued that although Cali-
fornia was "acting pursuant to state statutes,"lO there was no au-
thority from the United States. California claimed that the Pollard 
rule of ownership extended to offshore waters.ll The Court, in up-
holding the United States' claim, did not find Pollard controlling, 
holding that the Pollard rule of ownership as an incident of state 
sovereignty applied to inland waters only (i.e., waters within the 
territory of the state, such as rivers and harbors) and not to offshore 
waters and subsoil. 12 Having thus disposed of the restraints of 
Pollard, the Court, considering the question of offshore ownership, 
stated: 
we cannot say that the thirteen original colonies separately acquired 
ownership to the three-mile belt or the soil under it, even if they did 
acquire elements of the sovereignty of the English Crown by their 
Revolution against it.13 
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The ultimate result of California was the vesting of control of all 
offshore waters and the soil under them in the United States rather 
than in California. This decision reversed long-standing notions of 
state ownership and control of offshore areas. 
Almost immediately, Congress began working toward a legisla-
tive adjustment of the situation. On May 22, 1953 the Submerged 
Lands Act became law.14 
III. THE SUBMERGED LANDS ACT 
The records of the Congressional hearings held before the pas-
sage of the Submerged Lands Act state that Congress was acting "to 
clear up the controversy between the States and Federal Govern-
ment as to the resources in and beneath navigable waters within 
State boundaries."15 The legislative intent is explicit in the ex-
planatory preface of the Act: 
Its purpose is to confirm and establish the rights and claims of the 
48 States, long asserted and enjoyed with the approval of the Federal 
Government, to the lands and resources beneath navigable waters 
within their boundaries; subject ... to the right of the United 
States to exercise all of its constitutional regulatory powers over such 
lands and waters.16 
Section 1312 establishes that "[TJhe seaward boundary of each 
original coastal State is approved and confirmed as a line three 
geographic miles distant from its coast line ... "17 Section 1312 
further provides that "[NJothing in this section is to be construed 
as questioning or in any manner prejudicing the existence of any 
State's seaward boundary beyond three geographic miles if it was 
so provided by its constitution or laws prior to or at the time such 
State became a member of the Union ... "18 Additionally, section 
130 1 (b) states that "in no event shall the term 'boundaries' or the 
term 'lands beneath navigable waters' be interpreted as extending 
from the coast line more than three geographic miles into the 
Atlantic Ocean or more than three marine leagues into the Gulf 
of Mexico."19 
Legislative debate prior to the passage of the Act demonstrates 
that Congress intended to re-establish the commonly understood 
rule of seaward boundaries existing prior to California) that the 
states, rather than the federal government, controlled all waters 
within the boundaries of the states.20 However, the problem of what 
constituted the seaward boundary before California engendered 
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considerable debate. It appears that Congress had no intention of 
extending any Atlantic state's boundary beyond three geographic 
miles. It is clear that the provision set forth in section 1312 was 
inserted in recognition of the historic claims of some Gulf states 
to areas beyond the three mile limit set out in the Act. 21 
The Court considered the meaning of the Submerged Lands Act 
for the first time in United States v. Louisiana.22 Here, the United 
States sought a declaration that it was entitled to exclusive posses-
sion of the lands, minerals and other natural resources underlying 
the Gulf of Mexico more than three geographic miles seaward from 
the coast of each state. The states, relying on section 1301(b), 
claimed that their control extenq.ed three marine leagues (approx-
imately ten and one-half miles) into the Gulf.23 
The Court rejected the states' argument that section 1301 (b) 
automatically grants to the Gulf states a seaward boundary of three 
marine leagues into the Gulf24 if the states could establish the exis-
tence of such a pre-admission boundary.25 In developing the extent 
to which the state must bear this burden, the Court enunciated 
a two-fold test. First, a state's claim to a boundary in excess of three 
geographic miles must be based on "its Constitution or laws prior 
to or at the time such a state became a member of the Union."26 
Second, a state's claim must be supported by the action of Congress 
in admitting the state to the Union.27 The Court, therefore, rejected 
the state's contention "that pre-admission boundaries, standing 
alone, suffice to meet the requirements of the statute ... "28 
The only successful claim was that of Texas. In applying the two-
fold test that it had developed, the Court determined that Texas 
had met the burden of proof in both instances.29 
The claims of the remaining Gulf states were denied, however, 
for failure to comply with the two-fold test. After discussing the 
pre-admission history of the states in some detail,30 the Court con-
sidered the Congressional legislation admitting the states into the 
Union.31 In each case the act of admission established boundaries 
to include all islands within three (or more) leagues of the shore.32 
For example, Louisiana's southern boundary, as described in the 
act of Congress admitting it to the Union in 1812,33 extended to the 
Gulf of Mexico "then bounded by the said gulf, to the place of 
beginning, including all islands within three leagues of the coast."34 
The Court reasoned that the use of this language was not a mani-
festation of Congressional acceptance of the boundaries.35 This 
holding was based on contemporaneous documents that indicate 
832 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
only the islands were recognized as belonging to Louisiana, not the 
waters between the coast line and the islands.36 
IV. THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY 
In April, 1969 the United States filed a motion in the United 
States Supreme Court for leave to file a complaint against the thir-
teen Atlantic coastal states.37 In May, 1969 Maine filed its brief in 
opposition to the motion.38 The Court granted the United States' 
motion and the defendant states were allowed sixty days to answer.39 
The United States, invoking the original jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court,40 sought a declaratory judgment as to its rights over 
the seabed and subsoil underlying the Atlantic Ocean extending 
seaward from the ordinary low water mark· and from the outer 
limit of inland waters on the coast to the outer edge of the con-
tinental shelf, for the purpose of exploring the area and exploiting 
its natural resources41 to the exclusion of the defendant states ex-
cept to the extent of the rights granted to the states in the Sub-
merged Lands Act.42 The complaint further alleged that Maine, 
claiming some interest in the seabed and subsoil under the ocean 
in excess of three miles, had leased exploration rights to approxi-
mately 3.3 million acres in the disputed area.43 The United States 
sought an accounting for the sums derived from the leasing.44 
Maine in its answer denied that the Submerged Lands Act con-
tains any limitation upon its rights to dominion and control over 
the exploration of the seabed and subsoil underlying the marginal 
sea adjacent to its coast and affirmatively asserted that grants from 
the British Crown give it title to such seabed and subsoil to the 
exclusion of the United States.45 
The issues are in some ways similar to those raised in Loui-
siana.46 However, in Louisiana the defendant states relied on the Sub-
merged Lands Act as the basis for their claim. In Maine the defen-
dants deny that the Act may be construed to infer that prior to its 
effective date defendants were without power to exercise dominion 
and control over the area in question. 
While the jurisdiction of the United States over the exploration 
and exploitation of the continental shelf is generally settled in an 
international context,47 the question of jurisdiction as between 
federal and state government is still the subject of controversy. 
Maine alleges that the Submerged Lands Act does not affect its 
dominion and control over the disputed area in any way, since as 
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successor in title to certain grantees of the Crown of England it is 
and always has been entitled to exercise dominion and control over 
the exploration and development of the seabed and subsoil of the 
Atlantic Ocean adjacent to its coast line.48 Maine asserts that this 
fact distinguishes the present situation from that in both California 
and Louisiana, since the grantees of the Crown pre-existed the 
Union, the Union holding only that power which the individual 
states granted to it in the Constitution. In fact, the basis of this 
claim by Maine is traceable to the earliest colonial grants and 
charters. The Charter of Massachusetts Bay, granted by Charles I 
in 1629, included "all Islands in America aforesaide, in the [sa ide] 
Seas, or either of them, on the Westerne or Easterne Coastes" ;49 its 
successor, the Charter of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay in 
New England, granted in 1691 "all islands and islets lying within 
ten leagues directly opposite to the main land within said bounds."lIo 
The Treaty of Paris in 1783, formally ending the American Revolu-
tion, declared "His Britannic Majesty acknowledges ... Massachu-
setts Bay ... to be free, sovereign and independent ... (He) 
relinquishes all claims to the Government, propriety and territorial 
rights of the same, and every part thereof."51 When Massachusetts 
entered the Union it retained all these rights, with the exception 
of those specifically surrendered to the new federal government.52 
Subsequently in 1820 Maine became a separate state pursuant to 
an act of the Massachusetts legislature giving it the same rights of 
territory which Massachusetts formerly enjoyed.53 
Early rulings by the United States Supreme Court indicated that 
these grants and charters were considered effective to pass property 
and territorial grants to the states. 54 
However, the United States asserts that the Submerged Lands 
Act was enacted to establish the extent of both state and federal 
control. It is further argued by the United States that Louisiana 
established a test by which the claims of the coastal states should 
be tested. 
Applying this test to the states' contention in Maine, a result 
similar to Louisiana appears to be dictated, even though unlike the 
Gulf states, Maine's predecessor grantor (Massachusetts) pre-existed 
the Union. Maine relies on the Charter of Massachusetts Bay (1629) 
and the Charter of the Province of Massachusetts Bay in New En-
gland (1691), as well as the Treaty of Paris of 1783 as the basis of 
its claims. In each of these documents the granting language is al-
most identical to that cited in Louisiana. For example, the Treaty 
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of Paris of 1763 established the boundary of Mississippi as "the 
gulf of Mexico, including all islands within six leagues of the 
coast."55 Louisiana held that only the islands were granted, not the 
territorial waters between the coast and the islands. 56 
There is an even more persuasive argument stressed by the 
United States. It claimed that only limited sovereignty passed from 
the British king to the colonies as a result of the Revolution. The 
colonies can only claim what the British charters granted them. At 
the time that the charters were granted, the British government did 
not claim sovereignty over the seabed in excess of three miles. 57 
This would imply that even though the Crown's sovereignty did pass 
to the colonies as a result of the Revolution, it did not include 
sovereignty to the subsoil and seabed of the Atlantic Ocean.58 
This interpretation assumes added validity when the historical 
attitudes of the new states and the United States are examined. As 
the Court pointed out in California) at the time of the Revolution 
the notion of adjacent sea ownership was at best nebulous. 59 In 
fact, it was not until 1793 that international law began to recog-
nize the concept that a nation had control over the adjacent sea to 
the extent of three miles, the range of cannon. In that year Thomas 
Jefferson, then Secretary of State, noted that the extent of the mar-
ginal sea was "for the present to the distance of one sea league, or 
three geographic miles from the seashore."6o Additionally, Massa-
chusetts, the grantor of Maine, did not enact a statute proclaiming 
its seaward boundary at three miles until 1859.61 It is difficult for 
the states to claim, therefore, that their dominion and control of the 
area in question preceded that of the United States.62 Consequently, 
it does not appear possible that Maine can successfully maintain 
either that the Crown grants of England effectively passed title to 
offshore areas or that the United States, as a sovereign, recognized 
the validity of the states' claims to the areas in question. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Both the United States and the Atlantic coast states claim owner-
ship and control, with the attending exploration rights, of the sea-
bed and subsoil of the continental shelf. The United States asserts 
that the Submerged Lands Act clearly affirms its ownership of the 
area. The states claim that certain colonial grants and charters 
operate to vest control of the area in them, notwithstanding the 
Submerged Lands Act. It is submitted that whether the claims of 
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the states are measured against the Submerged Lands Act, or against 
the early colonial grants, they must fail. 
The Submerged Lands Act affirms that the ownership and con-
trol of the seabed and subsoil in excess of three geographic miles 
from the coast is vested in the United States. Any Atlantic coastal 
state claim to the area in question must fail when measured against 
the Act. 
The states contend, however, that the Submerged Lands Act is 
inapplicable to the present controversy, and that the Crown grants 
to them as colonies operate to give them dominion and control 
over the offshore areas. It is submitted that this contention must 
fail when subjected to historical analysis. 
Initially, the history of international law indicates that at the 
time the Crown grants were made there was no recognized rule of 
offshore ownership. It is then a tenuous contention that the grants 
were effective to pass such ownership to the colonies. However, 
even if the efficacy of these grants is assumed, the states' contention 
should still fail. The Court in Louisiana developed a two-part test 
against which state claims should be measured. The test indicates 
that a state must demonstrate Congressional approval of its bound-
aries at the time of its admission to the Union. Analysis of the 
United States' policies at the time the colonies became states indi-
cates that there was no recognition of offshore boundaries in excess 
of three miles. Thus, under either legal analysis, the claims of the 
states should fail. 
-~»--.-
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Constitution of the United States. 
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that "there is no belt of land under the sea adjacent to the Coast which 
is the property of the United States and not the property of the States." 
Thus while the seaward limit of the states' control was never expressly 
defined by the Court in these early cases, the Court did accept the 
assertion that the original states, rather than the United States, were the 
successors to the charters and grants of the English Sovereign. 
This judicial interpretation was however first challenged in the dicta 
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57 See, Queen v. Keyn, L.R. 2 Ex. 63,175 (Ex. 1876), in which the 
court refused to hold as a general proposition the right of the crown to 
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356 (1947). 
58 "The relatively recent appearance of the three-mile limit in En-
glish law, the distinction between inland and coastal waters, and the 
denial of the crown's general title to submerged lands under coastal 
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59 332 U.S. 19,32 (1947). 
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In the case of California we found that she, like the original thirteen 
colonies, never had dominium over that area (the marginal sea). The 
first claim to the marginal sea was asserted by the National Government. 
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Thus diplomatic history indicates that at the time of the Revolution 
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